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مترجم تحريري حر و/ أو مترجم فوري حر , مستخدم تم تأكيد شخصيته
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باي بال , حوالة مصرفية
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نماذج من النصوص المُترجمة: 4
عربي إلى إيطالي: I giovani arabi si aspettano la caduta di Daesh, affascinati invece dal modello emiratino General field: العلوم الاجتماعية
لغة نص المصدر - عربي شباب العرب يتوقع سقوط "داعش" .. وينبهر بنموذج الإمارات
هسبريس - عبد الرحيم الشرقاوي (كاريكاتير: سامر الشميري)
الأربعاء 19 أكتوبر 2016 - 12:05
الأغلبية الساحقة من الشباب العربي ينبذون تنظيم "داعش" ويتوقعون إخفاقه في إقامة دولة إسلامية، حسب ما خلص إليه استطلاع رأي للشباب العربي قامت به شركة أصداء بيرسون –مارستيلر المتخصصة في الاستشارة في العلاقات العامة.
الاستطلاع السنوي الثامن والمعنون بـ"في عقول وقلوب الشباب العربي"، والذي اعتمد على 3500 مقابلة مباشرة مع الشباب ذكورا وإناثا بعدة بلدان عربية من ضمنها المغرب، خلص إلى عدة استنتاجات أبرزها أن الشباب العربي يرى في تنظيم "داعش" العقبة الكبرى التي تواجه منطقة الشرق الأوسط، إذ عبّر 4 شباب من أصل 5 عن قلقهم إزاء تنظيم "داعش".
وحسب إحصاءات الاستطلاع ذاته، فقد استبعدت نسبة مماثلة من الشباب العربي أن يحصل تنظيم "داعش" على أيّ دعم؛ حتى لو توقف عن استخدام العنف المفرط. كما عبّر 76 في المائة من الشباب عن استبعادهم إمكانية نجاح تنظيم "داعش" في تأسيس دولة الإسلامية في العالم العربي.
وفيما يخص الأسباب التي تدفع العديدين إلى الالتحاق بـ"الدولة الإسلامية"، يعد الافتقار إلى الوظائف السبب الأول الذي يشجع الشباب على الانضمام إلى صفوف "داعش"، بالرغم من أن واحدا من أصل 4 شبان لا يستوعبون سبب انضمام أي شخص إلى هذا التنظيم. فيما برزت آراء أخرى مفسرة لهذه الخطوة؛ من بينها الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي والاعتقاد السائد لدى المنضمين بأن تفسيرهم للإسلام هو الأصح، فضلا عن آراء أخرى تقول إن الفساد الواضح في الحكومات العربية وبروز القيم العلمانية الغربية في المنطقة والسعي إلى تأسيس دولة خلافة مرتكزة على القيم الدينية أسباب من شأنها أن تدفع الشباب إلى الالتحاق بـ"داعش".
كما أن التوترات الدينية في المنطقة، خاصة ما بين السنة والشيعة، يمكن إدراجها مع الأسباب السالفة، لا سيما أن حوالي نصف الشباب العربي يعتقدون أن العلاقات بين السنة والشيعة تدهورت خلال السنوات الخمس الماضية. كما أن 72 في المائة من شباب البلدان العربية يعتقدون أن الانقسام السني الشيعي يعدّ عاملا رئيسيا في تأجيج الاضطرابات بالمنطقة.
52 في المائة كذلك من الشباب العربي يعتقدون أن الدين يلعب دورا أكبر مما ينبغي له في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، إذ وافق 61 في المائة من شباب دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي على الفكرة؛ في حين لم تتجاوز نسبة الشباب الموافقين على الفكرة بدول شمال إفريقيا 47 في المائة.
وللعام الخامس على التوالي لإجراء الاستطلاع، اعتبرت نسبة مهمة من العينة المختارة أن المملكة العربية السعودية هي الحليف الأول لبلدانهم في المنطقة، خاصة بالنسبة إلى شباب بلدان مجلس التعاون الخليجي بنسبة 93 في المائة يليهم شباب بلدان شمال إفريقيا بـ75 في المائة، في الوقت الذي يعتقد فيه الشباب العربي في بلدان شمال شرق المتوسط أن إيران هي حليف لبلدانهم بنسبة 54 في المائة.
الاستطلاع تطرّق كذلك للاتفاق النووي الإيراني وكذا الوضعية في سوريا؛ فـ57 في المائة من الشباب "الخليجي" أيدوا الاتفاق، وخاصة العمانيون منهم الذين وصلت نسبة المؤيدين منهم إلى 93 في المائة. في حين عارض 40 في المائة من الشباب "المغاربي" هذا الاتفاق.
كما تباينت الآراء كذلك حول النزاع السوري فيما إذا كان حربا بالوكالة أو حربا أهلية بين السوريين، فـ74 في المائة من اليمنيين اعتبروها حربا بالوكالة، فيما 79 في المائة من الأردنيين اعتبروها ثورة؛ لكن 47 في المائة من شباب ليبيا اعتبروها حربا أهلية. وعموما، اعتبرها 39 في المائة من مجمل الشباب المستجوب حربا بالوكالة تقوم بها قوى إقليمية ودولية.
أما حول وضعية العالم العربي بعد "الربيع"، فشباب مصر هو الوحيد الذي يرى أن العالم العربي سيكون أفضل حالا بسبب الربيع العربي بنسبة 61 في المائة. أما شباب تونس، فيرى العكس والشأن نفسه بالنسبة إلى ليبيا واليمن.
وناشد 67 في المائة من الشباب العربي القادة من أجل بذل جهود أكبر لتعزيز الحريات الشخصية وحقوق الإنسان. وترى النسبة نفسها من الشباب أنه يتعين على القادة العرب بذل جهد أكبر لتعزيز حقوق المرأة وحريتها الشخصية.
وخلص الاستطلاع ذاته إلى أن الإمارات تشكل نموذجا يحتذى به للبلدان الآمنة اقتصاديا ووجهة مفضلة للعيش وتأسيس الأعمال، حسب آراء الشباب العربي متقدمة على اختيارات أخرى كالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وألمانيا وكندا، إلى درجة أن أغلب الشباب يرغبون في أن تحذو بلدانهم حذو الإمارات العربية المتحدة؛ وذلك للمرة الخامسة على التوالي التي يتم فيها هذا الاختيار.
في حين أن 80 في المائة من شباب البلدان الأعضاء بمنظمة "الأوبك" عبّروا عن قلقهم المتزايد حيال هبوط أسعار النفط. كما أكد حوالي 4 من أصل 5 شباب على ضرورة مواصلة حكوماتهم لدعم تكاليف الطاقة؛ لكن في حال الرغبة بإلغاء الدعم، يعتقد الكثيرون أن ذلك يجب أن ينطبق على الأجانب فقط.
وخلص الاستطلاع إلى أن 32 في المائة من الشباب العربي يتابعون الأخبار يوميا عبر مصادر إلكترونية، بالرغم من أن التلفزيون يبقى في نظرهم المصدر الرئيسي الأكثر موثوقية للأخبار بنسبة 63 في المائة.
https://www.hespress.com/orbites/325166.html
ترجمة - إيطالي Secondo i risultati di un sondaggio, la stragrande maggioranza dei giovani arabi ripudia Daesh (ISIS) e non lo ritiene capace di costruire uno Stato islamico. Dall’ottavo sondaggio annuale dal titolo “Nei cuori e nelle menti dei giovani arabi”, basato su 3.500 interviste di ragazzi e ragazze di diversi paesi arabi, emerge che i giovani arabi ritengono l’organizzazione di Daesh la più grande difficoltà in Medio Oriente, con oltre quattro su cinque giovani che hanno espresso preoccupazione per tale fenomeno.
Per quanto riguarda i motivi per cui molti aderiscono al cosiddetto “Stato islamico”, essi adducono come prima ragione la mancanza di posti di lavoro, che spinge i giovani ad avvicinarsi a Daesh; altre motivazioni menzionate sono la convinzione tra le reclute che la loro interpretazione dell’Islam sia corretta, così come la corruzione dei governi arabi e l’emergere del secolarismo occidentale nei valori dei governi della regione. Anche le tensioni religiose regionali, in particolare quelle tra sunniti e sciiti, possono essere incluse: il 52% dei giovani arabi crede che la religione giochi un ruolo più importante di quello che dovrebbe in Medio Oriente, su questo concordano il 61% dei giovani nei paesi del Consiglio di cCooperazione del Golfo (CCG), mentre nei paesi del Nord Africa l’idea è sposata solo dal 47%.
Per il quinto anno consecutivo, una percentuale significativa di intervistati considera l’Arabia Saudita il principale alleato per il proprio paese nella regione; in particolare per i giovani dei paesi del CCG tale percentuale raggiunge il 93%, seguita da giovani dei paesi del Nord Africa al 75%.
Le opinioni variano sul conflitto siriano e sul fatto che sia una guerra per procura o una guerra civile tra siriani: il 74% di giovani yemeniti lo considerano una guerra per procura, mentre il 79% dei giordani lo ritengono una rivoluzione, ma il 47% dei giovani in Libia lo considera una guerra civile. Nel complesso, il 39% di tutti i giovani intervistati concorda sul fatto che in Siria sia in corso una guerra per procura svolta da potenze regionali e internazionali.
Infine sullo stato del mondo arabo dopo le “primavere”, i giovani egiziani (per il 61%) sono gli unici a credere che esso sia migliorato; i giovani tunisini ritengono che l’effetto sia stato opposto e lo stesso i giovani in Libia e Yemen. Il 67% dei giovani in generale ritiene che i leader arabi dovrebbero compiere maggiori sforzi per promuovere le libertà personali e i diritti umani.
L’indagine ha rilevato anche che gli Emirati Arabi Uniti costituiscono un modello in quanto paesi stabili economicamente e meta ambita per vivere o per creare un business; mentre l’80% dei giovani dei paesi membri dell’OPEC ha espresso preoccupazione per il calo dei prezzi del petrolio. L’indagine ha rilevato che il 32% dei giovani arabi segue la cronaca quotidiana tramite fonti digitali, anche se il 63% ritiene che la televisione rimanga la più affidabile e principale fonte di notizie.
http://arabpress.eu/giovani-arabi-aspettano-caduta-daesh-affascinati-modello-emirati/75828/
عربي إلى إيطالي: Lo scontro di civiltà tra l’Occidente cristiano e la Turchia musulmana General field: العلوم الاجتماعية
لغة نص المصدر - عربي صراع الحضارات: الغرب المسيحي وتركيا المسلمة مثالاً
د. فيصل القاسم
Jul 30, 2016
نخطئ كثيراً أحياناً عندما نحلل العلاقات الاجتماعية والدولية من منظور ماركسي مادي فقط، فقد درج الكثير منا على النظر إلى العلاقات بين الدول على أساس اقتصادي بحت، فأصبحنا لا نرى في العالم سوى المصالح الاقتصادية، وبتنا نعتبر أن العلاقات بين القوى الدولية تقوم بالدرجة الأولى على منافع مادية متناسين أن هناك عوامل أخرى في غاية الأهمية تحكم العلاقات الدولية وطبيعة التحالفات بين بلدان العالم.
صحيح أن الغرب يبدو وكأنه لا يفهم إلا لغة المصالح المادية بحكم تبنيه واعتماده الكامل على المفهوم الرأسمالي المادي. وصحيح أيضاً أنه غالباً من يعمل على تغليب المصلحة المادية على المصالح الأخرى في تعاملاته مع بقية الدول والقوى، ويضرب عرض الحائط بالجوانب الأخلاقية والإنسانية، لكن هذا لا يعني أبداً أن الغرب فقد، أو نسي هويته الثقافية والعقائدية تماماً. لا أبداً، بل عندما يجد الجد نرى أن الغرب يتعصب فجأة لهويته الثقافية والدينية، حتى لو كان غالبية الغربيين أصبحوا ملحدين، ولا يؤم الكنائس في بلد مثل بريطانيا سوى ثلاثة بالمائة أو أقل من السكان.
إن الاستفتاء البريطاني الأخير على الانسحاب من الاتحاد الأوروبي أظهر بشكل واضح أن البريطانيين مثلاً باتوا يضيقون ذرعاً بالمهاجرين الأجانب، حتى لو كانوا من الأوروبيين المسيحيين، فما بالك لو كانوا من الديانات الأخرى. لقد بات البريطاني العادي يشعر بأن الأوروبي الشرقي القادم من بولندا ورومانيا وبلغاريا يهدد هويته الوطنية والثقافية، ولا بد من يتوقف تدفق المهاجرين الأوربيين الشرقيين. صحيح أن هناك جانباً اقتصادياً للخروج البريطاني من الاتحاد الأوروبي، على اعتبار أن الأوروبيين الشرقيين باتوا ينتزعون الوظائف من أيدي البريطانيين، وينافسونهم على الخدمات التربوية والصحية والاجتماعية، لكن هناك أيضاً جانباً ثقافياً فاقعاً يقف وراء الانسحاب البريطاني من المجموعة الأوربية.
وإذا كان الأوروبيون المسيحيون يميزون ضد بعضهم البعض ض على أساس عرقي، فلا بد أن يكون لهم موقف من أصحاب الدينات والحضارات الأخرى. صحيح أن نظرية صراع الحضارات التي أطلقها المفكر الأمريكي صامويل هنتنغتون قد اختفت من التداول الإعلامي في السنوات الماضية بعد وفاته، لكنها حية ترزق على أرض الواقع.
وكان هنتنغتون قد تنبأ بحدوث صراعات دينية بين الغرب المسيحي والشرق الإسلامي وحتى الكونفوشي الصيني. صحيح أن الغرب احتضن ملايين المسلمين، وأن الإسلام أصبح الدين الثاني في بلد مثل فرنسا، بحيث يزيد عدد المسلمين الآن عن ستة ملايين، إلا أن الفرنسيين باتوا يعبرون عن امتعاضهم من الوجود الإسلامي بشكل صارخ. ويرى البعض أن الأعمال الإرهابية في فرنسا أعمال مدبرة لتشويه سمعة المسلمين والتحريض ضدهم لمغادرة فرنسا.
ولعل صراع الحضارات بين الغرب والإسلام يظهر بأنصع أشكاله في المثال التركي الأوروبي. ويرى كثير من الباحثين أن العداء الغربي المتصاعد لتركيا منذ سنوات هو شكل من أشكال الصراع الحضاري الذي بشر به هنتنغتون. ويعود ذلك إلى القفزات الحضارية الكبيرة التي أنجزتها تركيا منذ وصول حزب العدالة والتنمية الإسلامي إلى السلطة. واضح أن الغربيين ليسوا سعداء بظهور نموذج إسلامي حضاري ينافسهم في تركيا، لهذا راحوا يشيطنون الرئيس التركي أردوغان، لا بل وصل بهم الأمر إلى دعم انقلاب عسكري ضد نظامه. وكان الأوروبيون من قبل قد رفضوا رفضاً قاطعاً انضمام تركيا إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي بالرغم من انجازاتها الاقتصادية العملاقة. لاحظوا أن الأوروبيين قبلوا بانضمام دولة أوربية منهارة اقتصادياً كاليونان إلى الاتحاد، بينما رفضوا انضمام تركيا الصاعدة اقتصادياً بسرعة الصاروخ. والسبب كما واضح ثقافي وديني. ليس هناك مانع لدى الاتحاد الأوروبي أن ينفق الميارات على اقتصاد اليونان المتداعي كي تبقى اليونان عضواً في الاتحاد، بينما يرفضون انضمام بلد مسلم مثل تركيا يمكن أن يكون رافداً عظيماً للاقتصاد الأوروبي، خاصة وأن تركيا في عهد أردوغان انتقلت من المرتبة 111 إلى المرتبة السادسة عشرة في الاقتصاد العالمي، بحيث أصبحت من العشرين الأوائل، مع ذلك لم تحظ بشرف القبول في الاتحاد الأوروبي، لأنها ليست مسيحية. وهذا يؤكد ما ذهبنا إليه في بداية المقال من أن التحالفات الدولية هي تحالفات عقائدية حتى لو كان الجانب الاقتصادي يحظى بأهمية كبرى في العلاقات الدولية.
لقد كانت العولمة مجرد كذبة غربية كبرى للهيمنة على الدول الأخرى ونهب ثرواتها وتمييع هوياتها الثقافية، فالغرب يريد أن يغزو العالم أجمع بحجة العولمة، لكنه لا يسمح لأي ثقافة أخرى ان تخترق مجتمعاته، أو حتى أن تبرز على الساحة الدولية. ولنا في المثال التركي عبرة لمن يعتبر.
٭ كاتب وإعلامي سوري
http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=573644
ترجمة - إيطالي Spesso sbagliamo ad analizzare le relazioni internazionali esclusivamente da una prospettiva marxista materiale, che considera i rapporti tra gli Stati costruiti su base puramente economica, dimenticando che ci sono altri fattori importanti che determinano le relazioni e le alleanze internazionali. È vero che l’Occidente sembra capire solo il linguaggio degli interessi materiali, e che spesso li privilegia rispetto ad altri interessi nei suoi rapporti con altri Stati, ma ciò non significa che abbia del tutto dimenticato la propria identità culturale e ideologica: nei momenti critici torna a far leva improvvisamente sull’identità culturale e religiosa, e questo nonostante la maggior parte degli occidentali sia oggi atea.
Il recente referendum sull’uscita britannica dall’Unione Europea mostra che gli inglesi sono diventati insofferenti nei confronti della folla di immigrati stranieri, anche se europei cristiani. Essi ritengono i paesi dell’Europa orientale una minaccia per l’identità nazionale e culturale e che sia necessario fermare il flusso di migranti da Polonia, Romania e Bulgaria. É vero che c’è un aspetto economico in ciò, a causa della concorrenza degli europei orientali nella ricerca del lavoro e nei servizi di educazione, sanitari e sociali, ma esiste anche un aspetto culturale non trascurabile. Se ci sono europei cristiani che discriminano altri europei cristiani su base etnica dunque, è naturale che discrimino i seguaci di altre religioni e civiltà: la teoria dello scontro di civiltà di Huntington è forse scomparsa dai mass media negli ultimi anni, ma è ancora viva nella realtà.
È vero che l’Occidente ha accolto milioni di musulmani e l’Islam è diventata la seconda religione in paesi come ad esempio la Francia. Tuttavia i francesi stanno ora esprimendo il loro risentimento nei confronti della presenza islamica in maniera aperta. Molti ricercatori ritengono che la crescente ostilità occidentale nei confronti della Turchia da alcuni anni sia una forma di conflitto culturale del genere. Ciò è dovuto all’emergere di un modello di civiltà islamica nel paese con l’arrivo al potere del partito islamista Giustizia e Sviluppo (AKP). Ma già gli europei avevano rifiutato categoricamente l’adesione della Turchia all’Unione Europea, e ciò nonostante i grandi vantaggi economici che avrebbe apportato.
La scelta di accettare l’adesione di paesi economicamente a terra come la Grecia e rifiutarne uno in pieno sviluppo economico come la Turchia, ha chiare motivazioni religiose e culturali: un paese che avrebbe potuto portare beneficio all’economia europea, soprattutto da quando la Turchia sotto Erdogan si è spostato alla sedicesima posizione nell’economia globale, non ha ricevuto l’ammissione europea perché non è cristiano. Ciò conferma che le alleanze internazionali sono alleanze ideologiche, anche se il lato economico ha grande importanza. L’Occidente vuole conquistare il mondo intero con il pretesto della globalizzazione, ma non permette a qualsiasi altra cultura di penetrare la propria società, o di distinguersi in ambito internazionale.
http://arabpress.eu/lo-scontro-civilta-loccidente-cristiano-la-turchia-musulmana/74705/
أنجليزي إلى إيطالي: Le complesse origini della lingua araba General field: الفن/الأدب
لغة نص المصدر - أنجليزي To understand Arabs and their culture, one must first understand their language, but with many conflicting theories about its origins, this is no easy task.
To celebrate a language used by hundreds of millions of people around the world, December 18 is the designated UN Arabic Language Day. The day was established by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) in 2010 to “celebrate multilingualism and cultural diversity as well as to promote equal use of all six of its official working languages throughout the organisation.”
This date was chosen because it was the day in 1973 when Arabic became the sixth official working language of the General Assembly of the United Nations and its main commissions – the others being Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
“Arabic is a very rich language; it has different dialects and different calligraphic forms and styles,” says Hasan Al Naboodah, an Emirati historian and dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at the UAE University in Al Ain. “Its history is as complex as the history of the countries that use the language.”
There are four major regional dialects of Arabic spoken in the Arab world today, with dialectic variations in different countries: the Arabic of the Maghreb (North Africa), Egyptian Arabic (Egypt and Sudan), Levantine Arabic (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine), and Iraqi/Gulf Arabic.
According to various sources, the first manifestations of the language appear to go back to the second millennium BC. Arabic belongs to the Semitic family of languages, which also includes Hebrew, Aramaic and Phoenician.
Other languages have used the Arabic script – Hausa, Kashmiri, Kazak, Kurdish, Kyrgyz, Malay, Morisco, Pashto, Persian/Farsi, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tatar, Turkish, Uyghur and Urdu – although some of these have switched to Latin script.
“Quraish of Mecca are said to be the first to speak Arabic ‘Fos ha’, and so the Quran today is that of the dialect or style of reading that Prophet Mohammed used himself,” Al Naboodah says.
This form of Arabic goes back to pre-Islamic poetry and is an elegant, or clear, form of Arabic. Muslim scholars say that initially the Quran was revealed by God and taught by the Prophet Mohammed in seven types of qera’at (readings). At the time, they were the most dominant dialects in spoken Arabic.
Arabic originsClick on the graphic to expand
Many years after the Quran was made into a book, a copy owned by Uthman ibn Affan, a companion of Prophet Mohammed and the third Caliph of Islam, had the Arabic letters dotted. Diacritics such as tashkeel or formations were added, including harakat motions or vowel marks, as well as various tone and pronunciation grids to unify and standardise it.
“Some say Arabic script originated from Al Hirah (fourth-to-seventh-century Mesopotamia) in the north, while others say it originated from the south of Arabia, from Himyar (110 BC to AD 525),” Al Naboodah. “The origin of Arabic is a highly debated topic, with new discoveries still happening.”
A discovery in 2014 by a French-Saudi expedition team hailed “the oldest known inscription in the Arabic alphabet” at a site located near Najran in Saudi Arabia. The script, which was found on stelae (stone slabs) that has been preliminarily dated to AD 470, corresponds to a period in which there was a missing link between Nabataean and Arabic writing.
“The first thing that makes this find significant is that it is a mixed text, known as Nabataean Arabic, the first stage of Arabic writing,” says epigrapher Frédéric Imbert, a professor at Aix-Marseille University.
The Nabataean script was developed from Aramaic writing during the second century BC and continued to be used until around the fourth or fifth century. Nabataean is therefore considered the direct precursor of the Arabic script. Nabataean script is a close ancestor, and the Najran style is the “missing link” between Nabataean and the first “Kufi” inscriptions.
Until this discovery, one of the earliest inscriptions in the Arabic language was written in the Nabataean alphabet, found in Namara (modern Syria) and dated to AD 328, on display at the Louvre in Paris.
The history of Arabic continues to be debated. Modern standard Arabic is different from Quranic as well as from classical Arabic. It has gone through a process of “Europeanisation” that changed parts of the vocabulary and also deeply influenced the grammar.
“Linguistic evidence seems to point to an origin of the Semitic languages somewhere between the Fertile Crescent [an area that spanned the top of the Arabian Peninsula from Egypt to Syria and Kuwait] and the Arabian Peninsula,” says Stephan Guth, professor of Arabic language and Middle Eastern literatures at the University of Oslo.
Over millennia, these languages spread, as different groups left their homelands, carrying their languages with them into various parts of the Middle East and neighbouring areas.
“A language is a continuum with many different stages of development, many of which may be addressed (and actually are addressed) by individual names, and it depends on the criteria that you decide to make decisive,” Guth says.
“The main challenge in writing a history of Arabic is that there is only little written evidence for what probably is the larger part of its history, and that for the period dating before pre-Islamic poetry we only have unvocalised material, so that we only can guess or try to reconstruct with linguistic methods, but rarely be 100 per cent sure how things actually were pronounced. There are some hints from languages that were in contact with Arabic and wrote the vowels (Akkadian, Greek, Latin), but the material is scarce and often only some names,” he says.
Guth says that the most recent study, by Leonid Kogan in 2015, dealing with the question of internal grouping within the Semitic language family places Arabic according to two principles:
Genetically the chain moves from Proto-Semitic to West Semitic to Central & Ethio-Semitic to Central Semitic to Arabic. This implies that genetically Arabic would be a “sister” language of other Central Semitic languages, like Hebrew and the Aramaic (Aramoid) group.
However, Guth says, because of geographical vicinity, which caused language contact and influence beyond the Central Semitic “genes”, Arabic also shares a lot of features with the languages in the South, particularly Classical Ethiopic (Geez).
“As for non-Semitic influences, they have always been there (but also Arabic influenced the others), as always happens when people are in contact. All the long political and cultural history that Arab people have gone through is reflected in the language.”
The professor explains: “In pre-Islamic times you find borrowings from Akkadian, Aramaic, Ethiopic, South Arabian, Greek, Latin; after the conquests, when the Arabs came into contact with other people, there is, for example, a lot of Middle Persian and Turkish, and in early Abbasid times, when you had the Bayt Al Hikma in Bagdad, where all the translations were made, there is a heavy influx of classical Greek. Later on, contacts with the Mediterranean intensified, so the language was enriched by words from Italian and so on.
“Not to speak of the colonial period and the 19th century when European cultural domination became so strong that larger parts of the vocabulary had to be invented, or adapted (and also grammar changed to a certain extent); today, it is mainly English and (in the Maghreb) French that are major sources of borrowing,” Guth says.
As for dialects, he says: “Well, this is a chapter in its own right.”
So as the world celebrates Arabic on Sunday, it heralds a complicated language, its story difficult to reconstruct because historic truth is still much shrouded and obscured by legends and myths.
ترجمة - إيطالي Per capire gli Arabi e la loro cultura è necessario prima di tutto capire la loro lingua ma, a causa delle molteplici teorie in conflitto sulla sua origine, questo non è un compito facile.
Per celebrare un idioma parlato da centinaia di migliaia di persone nel mondo, le Nazioni Unite hanno proclamato il 18 dicembre Giornata Mondiale della Lingua Araba. Più precisamente è stata l’UNESCO nel 2010, per promuovere il “plurilinguismo, la multiculturalità così come un uso equo di tutte le sei lingue ufficiali dell’organizzazione”.
Proprio il 18 dicembre del 1973, infatti, l’arabo è diventato la sesta lingua ufficiale di lavoro dell’Assemblea Generale dell’ONU e delle sue principali commissioni (le altre sono cinese, inglese, francese, russo e spagnolo).
“L’arabo è una lingua molto ricca, comprende molti differenti dialetti e stili calligrafici”, dice Hasan al-Naboodah, storico del Collegio delle scienze umane e sociali presso l’Università degli Emirati Arabi Uniti Al-Ain. “La sua storia è complessa come la storia dei Paesi che la parlano”.
Ci sono quattro principali dialetti regionali di arabo parlato, con variazioni secondo ciascun paese: l’arabo del Maghreb (Africa settentrionale), l’arabo egiziano (Egitto e Sudan), l’arabo levantino (Libano, Siria, Giordania, Palestina), e l’arabo iracheno o del Golfo.
Secondo varie fonti, le prime manifestazioni della lingua risalirebbero al secondo millennio prima di Cristo. La lingua araba appartiene alla famiglia dei linguaggi semitici insieme all’ebraico, all’aramaico e al fenicio. Molte altre lingue fanno uso dei caratteri arabi, come il curdo, il kazako, il moresco, il pashto, il farsi, il punjabi, il turco e l’urdu, anche se alcune di queste hanno poi adottato i caratteri latini.
“Si tramanda che i Quraish della Mecca siano stati i primi a parlare l’arabo fusha, perciò il Corano di oggi sarebbe scritto nel dialetto parlato dal profeta stesso”, continua al-Naboodah.
Questa forma di arabo, elegante e chiara, deriva dalla poesia pre-islamica; molti anni dopo, quando il Corano fu trascritto per la prima volta, furono inclusi anche i punti diacritici e i movimenti vocalici così come alcuni toni e pronunce per standardizzarne la lettura.
“Alcuni dicono che l’arabo scritto sia nato nel nord della Mesopotamia, altri dal sud della penisola arabica”, continua al-Naboodah. “Le origini della lingua araba continuano però ad essere oggetto di studio, anche grazie a continua nuove scoperte”.
Nel 2014 una spedizione franco-saudita dichiarò di aver ritrovato la più antica iscrizione in arabo, risalente al 110 a.C., vicino a Najran, in Arabia Saudita. Fino a quel momento una delle più antiche testimonianze di arabo scritto era considerata una stele trovata a Namara, nella moderna Siria e datata 328 d.C.
Certo è che la storia dell’arabo è ancora oggi oggetto di dibattito: l’arabo standard moderno differisce da quello coranico come da quello classico, essa ha senz’altro subito un processo di “europeizzazione” che ha influito sul vocabolario e sulla grammatica.
“Prove linguistiche sembrano indicare l’origine delle lingue semitiche da qualche parte tra la Mezzaluna Fertile e la Penisola araba”, dice Stephan Guth, docente di lingua araba e letterature del Medio Oriente presso l’Università di Oslo.
Attraverso i millenni e con gli spostamenti dei diversi gruppi di lingua semitica, questi linguaggi si sono poi diffusi in varie parti del Medio Oriente e nelle zone circostanti.
Il problema principale nel ricostruire la storia della lingua araba è che esistono pochissime prove scritte di gran parte della sua storia, e che del periodo precedente la poesia pre-islamica si possiede solo materiale non vocalizzato, da cui è difficile ricavare schemi linguistici.
Un recente studio del 2015 pone l’arabo all’interno della famiglia delle lingue semitiche in base a due principi: geneticamente l’arabo potrebbe essere una “sorella” di altre lingue semitiche come l’ebraico e l’aramaico, ma per questioni di vicinanza geografica ha molto in comune con le lingue del sud, in particolare la lingua classica dell’Etiopia.
“Le influenze da parte di lingue non semitiche non sono mai mancate, così come l’arabo ha sempre condizionato le altre lingue con cui veniva in contatto: la lunga storia politica e culturale dei popoli arabi è riflessa nel linguaggio stesso. Questo fin dal periodo pre-islamico, a cui risalgono prestiti dall’aramaico, dal greco e dal latino; dopo le conquiste arabe vi furono poi grandi influenze dal persiano e dal turco, e più tardi con l’intensificarsi dei contatti con il mediterraneo, la lingua si arricchì di parole dall’italiano ecc.”, continua lo studioso.
“Senza parlare del periodo coloniale e del diciannovesimo secolo, quando il dominio culturale europeo diventò così forte che grandi parti di vocabolario dovettero essere inventate o adattate, e anche la grammatica; oggi l’inglese e (in Maghreb) il francese sono le maggiori fonti di prestiti linguistici”. Infine, per quanto riguarda le forme di arabo dialettale, “questo è un capitolo a parte” sostiene.
Quindi domenica 18 dicembre il mondo celebrerà la lingua araba, un linguaggio complesso, dalla storia difficile da ricostruire perché la sua realtà storica è ancora oscurata da miti e leggende.
http://arabpress.eu/complesse-origini-lingua-araba/76566/
أنجليزي إلى إيطالي: Analisi politica: Hamas e il 7° congresso di Al-Fatah General field: العلوم الاجتماعية
لغة نص المصدر - أنجليزي It seems that Hamas is keen not to stand as an obstacle hindering the convening of Fatah’s seventh conference scheduled for late November 2016. This is evidence in the messages of reassurance issued by Hamas leaders, stressing keenness on Fatah’s unity, non-interference in its internal affairs, non-support for any party against another within Fatah, and also Hamas’s non-objection to Fatah members residing in Gaza Strip (GS) to travel to take part in the Fatah conference.
Rearranging the Palestinian Home Front
One of the key objectives of Fatah’s seventh conference is discussing the internal Palestinian situation, and ways to re-organize the home front. Subsequently, the conference will have to tackle the issue of the relationship with Hamas and the implementation of the reconciliation agreement signed in May 2011, and how Hamas (and resistance forces) can be integrated into the executive and legislative institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA).
However, this will not be a simple task, unless radical revisions are made regarding the fundamental causes of the differences between the two sides. Fatah and Hamas have a long history of competition, conflict, and distrust. Although the two factions represent the main two pillars of the modern Palestinian national movement, and together account for more than 80% of the votes cast by Palestinian voters, they have yet to succeed to manage their differences in the framework of one institutional structure, agree on the priorities of the Palestinian national project, or implement the agreements they have signed. The conflict between the two sides has in many cases led to negative effects on Palestinian action, with mutual obstructionism under the pretext of serving the national interest.
Attempts to reach an agreement between Fatah and Hamas date back to the late 1980s, and the early ascendancy of Hamas as a resistance movement and a key party in the Palestinian equation. Meetings were subsequently held in Yemen, Tunisia, Khartoum, and Cairo between 1990 and 1995. Meeting were held in Cairo again between 2002 and 2005, culminating with the Cairo Agreement on 17/3/2005, which paved the way for the conclusion of al-Aqsa Intifadah and the Palestinian legislative elections, and launching of rebuilding the PLO project. More meetings were concluded in the National Conciliation Charter (the Prisoners’ Charter) in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007, and the Cairo Agreement in 2011.
It is a mistake to reduce the differences between Fatah and Hamas to being a struggle over power. Hamas’s Islamic frame of reference prevents it from holding agreements that would lead to compromising parts of Palestine or recognising Israel, while Fatah’s pragmatic secular frame of reference does not stop it from holding agreements such as the Oslo Accords as an interim program for national action.
On the other hand, the priority for national action for Fatah is linked to the peace process as a gateway for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank (WB) and GS. By contrast, the priority for Hamas is armed resistance as the right approach to ending the occupation. For this reason, Mahmud ‘Abbas considers resistance tactics and weaponry to be futile, while Hamas sees the futility rather lying in the peace process.
At a time when Fatah accuses Hamas of causing the division, and of staging a coup against the legitimate authority by taking over GS, Hamas accuses Fatah of authoritarianism and monopoly of decision-making, domination of the PLO, obstruction of institutions, and blocking Hamas and other forces from being real partners… Hamas also accuses Fatah of obstructing the work of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)… and precipitating the Palestinian division as a result of engaging in and imposing the Oslo Accords on Palestinians, while ignoring broad-based opposition (The Ten Palestinian Factions) to it.
Furthermore, both sides have exchanged accusations of disrupting the reconciliation. Fatah accuses Hamas of lack of seriousness in implementing the reconciliation and handing over government institutions in GS… For its part, Hamas accuses Fatah of the same, saying Fatah controls the course of reconciliation through its domination of the PLO and the PA, and ability to convene meetings of the Provisional Leadership Framework. Hamas says Fatah uses security coordination with the Israelis against its opponents in Hamas, and uses its Arab and international networks hostile to Hamas and “political Islam” movements to corner its opponents.
Participation of Fatah’s Representatives From GS
Fatah-Hamas relations are rather cold. Tensions have been high in recent months: Hamas has accused Fatah of doing an about-face on holding municipal elections using the Supreme Court of Justice as a guise, of continuing security coordination with Israel, of pressing a crackdown against resistance operatives, of ignoring reconciliation agreements, and of ignoring the issue of the civil servants appointed by the Hamas government in GS under Isma‘il Haniyyah. However, Hamas has now declared that it will not stop Fatah representatives in GS from attending the Fatah conference in WB.
The Haniyyah government had stopped those same representatives from attending Fatah’s sixth conference in Ramallah, in the summer of 2009, in retaliation for the crackdown by PA security forces in WB against Hamas and resistance operatives. Hamas’s measures were met with fury by Fatah, which saw them as an attempt to thwart the conference and undermine its credibility.
Dahlan
In the meeting between Mahmud ‘Abbas and Khalid Mish‘al brokered by Qatar in late October 2016, ‘Abbas was preoccupied with his crisis with Muhammad Dahlan more than anything else, including reconciliation. He expressed his anger with the pressure on him regarding reconciliation with Dahlan and the latter’s rehabilitation into Fatah. In the meeting and in other meetings, ‘Abbas received reassurances from Hamas’s leadership that it would not support Dahlan and would not interfere in Fatah internal affairs.
Some Fatah leaders were concerned Hamas could intervene to influence the Fatah conference by playing the Dahlan card. They had noticed increased activity of pro-Dahlan elements in GS, with money being brought in to the Strip to support “charitable” projects… However, Dahlan’s use of political money, and attempts to mobilize support are not limited to GS. He is active among Fatah cadres in WB itself, and in refugee camps abroad.
Dahlan, who is known for his ambition to take over leadership of Fatah and the PA, was elected as a member of Fatah central committee in 2009, after which he had major differences with Mahmud ‘Abbas… culminating with Dahlan’s expulsion from Fatah’s Central Committee in June 2011. He was accused of corruption and abuse of power… and had to flee to the UAE where he has been serving as advisor to Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.
Apparently, Hamas’s differences with Dahlan are no less significant than those he has with ‘Abbas… Wide segments of Hamas leadership hold Dahlan responsible for the lawlessness seen in GS and attempted coup against the government of Isma‘il Haniyyah… prompting Hamas to take over GS militarily in the summer of 2007. Hamas looks with suspicion at Dahlan’s role in the regional crackdown on “political Islam” movements and opposition forces… and has many questions about his Israeli and Western connections.
A number of Hamas leaders throughout the past months affirmed the group’s neutrality in Fatah’s internal rivalries… Some might even hinted that ‘Abbas, despite his bad conduct vis-à-vis Hamas, remained a better choice than Dahlan.
For example, Salah al-Bardawil has said that Hamas would not like to see Fatah “fragmented and destroyed….because that would be a nuclear bomb that will undermine the reputation and energy of the Palestinian people” (Site of Alresalah Press, Palestine, 16/5/2016). In another statement, Bardawil said that Hamas was not part of the dispute between ‘Abbas and Dahlan, and had no interest to be involved… and that those who speak of rapprochement between Hamas and Dahlan want to evade their political responsibilities and blame others for failing to manage their differences (Quds Press International News Agency, London, 23/10/2016). Another Hamas leader, Khalil al-Hayyeh, denied there was a deal between Hamas and Dahlan, and stressed that intra-Fatah differences were adversely affecting the Palestinian issue and that Fatah’s restoration of its energy and strength would be a source of strength for the Palestinian people (Al-Istiqlal, Gaza, 6/10/2016).
On the other hand, the authorities in GS uncovered a secret cell linked to Tawfiq al-Tirawi and Dahlan… (Site of Aljazeera.net, 3/5/2016, and site of Arabs 48, 4/5/2016). The cell sought to demonize GS and Hamas in the eyes of the Palestinians, Egyptians, and international public opinion. This raised serious concerns in Hamas’ ranks regarding Dahlan’s dangerous role.
The cell whose discovery was announced by Bardawil planned to assassinated ‘Abbas-linked Fatah figures like Ahmad Nasr, Ma’mun Sweidan, Jamal Kayid, and ‘Imad al-Agha, all Abbas-appointed governors in GS areas. The cell was accused of recording videos containing threats to the regime in Egypt and to Abbas in the name of ISIS. It seems that the capture of this cell, after which Hamas handed over a number of documents to ‘Abbas related to the cell, was an attempt by Hamas to show its credibility and to reassure ‘Abbas.
Finally, the biggest challenge Fatah faces is not Hamas, but three key crises: The first linked to vision and political path, and the need for a serious review of the peace process and the experience of the PLO and the PA, in order to reorient the compass in the service of the Palestinian national project.
The second linked to the internal and organisational structures of Fatah and addressing the corruption and weakness they suffer from.
And the third linked to the leadership, which need new blood and a plan for what comes after ‘Abbas.
ترجمة - إيطالي Dalle dichiarazioni rassicuranti dei suoi leader, sembra che Hamas non voglia ostacolare il 7° congresso di al-Fatah di fine novembre. Ha affermato di non voler interferire, né supportare alcun partito contro gli altri all’interno del movimento, e che non impedirà ai membri di Fatah residenti nella striscia di Gaza di prendere parte alla conferenza.
Uno degli obiettivi principali di quest’ultima è la discussione della situazione interna palestinese e la riorganizzazione del fronte nazionale, oltre al tema del rapporto con Hamas e dell’attuazione dell’accordo di riconciliazione firmato a maggio 2011, nonché i modi per integrare le forze della resistenza, tra cui Hamas stesso, nelle istituzioni esecutive e legislative dell’Organizzazione per la Liberazione della Palestina (OLP) e dell’Autorità Palestinese (AP).
Tuttavia questo non sarà un compito semplice, vista la lunga storia di competizione, conflitto e diffidenza reciproca tra i due partiti. Essi costituiscono i principali pilastri del movimento nazionale palestinese moderno e insieme rappresentano oltre l’80% dei voti espressi dagli elettori palestinesi, ma non sono mai riusciti a gestire le loro differenze nel quadro di una struttura istituzionale, compromettendo in molti casi l’esito delle azioni palestinesi, a causa dell’ostruzionismo reciproco con il pretesto di servire l’interesse nazionale.
I tentativi di raggiungere un accordo risalgono alla fine del 1980 e all’ascesa di Hamas, ma è sbagliato ridurre le differenze tra Fatah e Hamas ad una lotta per il potere. La matrice islamica di Hamas impedisce la conclusione di accordi che porterebbero a compromettere parti della Palestina o a riconoscere Israele, mentre l’atteggiamento pragmatico di Fatah tende a considerare eventuali accordi come mezzi per una realizzazione nazionale. D’altra parte, la priorità dell’azione nazionale per Fatah è legata al processo di pace come strumento per la creazione di uno stato palestinese in Cisgiordania e a Gaza, mentre per Hamas è la resistenza armata per porre fine all’occupazione.
Fatah incolpa Hamas di dividere il fronte palestinese e di voler controllare Gaza, mentre Hamas accusa Fatah di monopolizzare il processo decisionale e controllare l’OLP. Inoltre, entrambe le parti si sono scambiate accuse di ostacolare la riconciliazione. I rapporti sono stati freddi e le tensioni alte negli ultimi mesi: Hamas sostiene che Fatah continui il coordinamento per la sicurezza con Israele, che ignori gli accordi di riconciliazione, e la questione dei funzionari nominati dal governo di Hamas a Gaza. Tuttavia la sua leadership ha affermato che non impedirà ai funzionari di partecipare al congresso, mentre agli stessi nel 2009 aveva impedito di recarsi al ritrovo.
Infine, la sfida maggiore che Fatah deve affrontare è la triplice crisi interna: la prima legata alla visione e al percorso politici, e alla necessità di una revisione del processo di pace e dell’esperienza dell’OLP e la AP; la seconda delle strutture interne e organizzative del partito e della corruzione e debolezza di cui soffrono; la terza legata al bisogno di una nuova e rinnovata leadership, nonché di un piano per ciò che verrà dopo Abbas.
http://arabpress.eu/analisi-politica-hamas-e-congresso-al-fatah/76357/
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الخبرة
سنوات الخبرة في الترجمة: 7. مسجل في بروز.كوم:Nov 2017 أصبح عضوا Oct 2018
I'm an Italian translator with a strong and deep knowledge of Arabic language, culture, economy and law. I'm passionate about languages and using them to create information, communication and relations. Previous experience in news and opinion articles translation.
كلمات مفتاحية: arabic, italian, news, media, translation
عضو منذ Oct '18
الخبرة 